

Message Text

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ACTION ACDA-10

INFO OCT-01 EUR-12 ISO-00 ACDE-00 ERDA-05 CIAE-00 H-02

INR-07 IO-10 L-02 NSAE-00 OIC-02 OMB-01 PA-01 PM-03

PRS-01 SAJ-01 SAM-01 SP-02 SS-15 USIA-06 TRSE-00

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FM USDEL MBFR VIENNA

TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 0919

SECDEF WASHDC PRIORITY

INFO ALL MBFR MISSIONS 0146

AMEMBASSY SOFIA

AMEMBASSY LISBON

AMEMBASSY PRAGUE

AMEMBASSY WARSAW

AMEMBASSY ATHENS

AMEMBASSY LUXEMBOURG

AMEMBASSY BERLIN UNN

USDEL SALT TWO GENEVA

S E C R E T MBFR VIENNA 0135

GENEVA FOR CSCE DEL AND DISTO

FROM US REP MBFR

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PARM, NATO

SUBJECT: MBFR NEGOTIATIONS: SUMMARY REPORT FOR PERIOD MARCH
24-25, 1975

1. BEGIN SUMMARY. THE MBFR NEGOTIATIONS PAUSED
FOR EASTER FOLLOWING THE MARCH 24 INFORMAL AND MARCH 25
PLENARY MEETINGS; THE NEXT PLENARY MEETING IS SCHEDULED
FOR APRIL 3; NO EASTER RECESS IS BEING ANNOUNCED TO THE
PRESS. IN THIS WEEK'S INFORMAL SESSION, EASTERN REPS

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STRESSED THE THEME THAT REFUSAL OF THE WEST TO REDUCE

AIR FORCES AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND RELUCTANCE OF THE NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS TO ASSUME SPECIFIC REDUCTION OBLIGATIONS FROM THE OUTSET WERE JUSTIFIABLE GROUNDS TO QUESTION THE WILLINGNESS OF THE WEST TO MOVE FORWARD TO AN AGREEMENT. THE ONLY PLENARY STATEMENT WAS PRESENTED BY THE BELGIAN REP AND FOCUSED ON THE WESTERN DEMAND FOR A COMMON CEILING IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER. END SUMMARY.

2. IN THIS WEEK'S INFORMAL MEETING, THE EAST CONTINUED TO PRESS ITS CHARGE THAT STUBBORN ADHERENCE OF WESTERN PARTICIPANTS TO POSITIONS CONTRARY TO THE AGREED PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY UNAVOIDABLY RAISED THE QUESTION OF WHETHER WESTERN PARTICIPANTS, ESPECIALLY NON-US WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, WERE NOT TRYING TO AVOID A REDUCTION AGREEMENT. US REP MADE THE POINT THAT THE EXISTENCE OF DESTABILIZING EASTERN GROUND FORCE SUPERIORITY, PLUS THE NEW ADVANTAGES WHICH THE EAST WOULD GAIN FROM THE FACT THAT WESTERN FORCES IN THE AREA OF REDUCTIONS WOULD BE DECREASED AND LIMITED WHILE SOVIET FORCES ON THE TERRITORY ADJACENT TO THE REDUCTION AREA WOULD NOT BE LIMITED, JUSTIFIED THE WESTERN REDUCTION APPROACH CALLING FOR A COMMON CEILING.

3. EASTERN REPS POINTEDLY CRITICIZED US REP'S PRESENTATION FOR OMITTING TREATMENT OF REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR AND AIR FORCES. SOVIET REPS KHLESTOV AND SMIRNOVSKY, AS WELL AS CZECHOSLOVAK REP MEISNER AND POLISH REP STRULAK, REPEATEDLY CONTENDED THAT THE WESTERN POSITION WAS UNREALISTIC AND NON-OBJECTIVE BECAUSE IT DEALT WITH ONLY THE GROUND FORCE ELEMENT OF THE MILITARY BALANCE. SMIRNOVSKY STRESSED THAT NUCLEAR FORCES WERE THE MOST DESTRUCTIVE FORCE IN THE AREA. MEISNER INSISTED THAT ALL FORCE ELEMENTS IN THE AREA MUST BE INCLUDED IN REDUCTIONS. IN REPLY, US AND FRG REPS POINTED OUT THAT THE WEST HAD ANALYZED ALL FORCES IN THE AREA BEFORE COMING TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE IMBALANCE IN GROUND FORCES WAS THE MAIN DESTABILIZING FACTOR. EASTERN REPS SAID THE WEST STILL HAD NOT MADE AN ADEQUATE RESPONSE ON THIS ISSUE.

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4. THE EAST ALSO CRITICIZED THE WEST FOR HAVING REFUSED, AFTER SOME 18 MONTHS OF NEGOTIATION, TO TAKE ACCOUNT OF EASTERN DEMANDS ON THE ISSUE OF WHOSE FORCES SHOULD BE REDUCED FROM THE OUTSET. POLISH REP SAID THAT WESTERN FAILURE TO PROVIDE FOR SPECIFIC OBLIGATIONS BY ALL WESTERN DIRECT PARTICIPANTS, AND TO INCLUDE ARMAMENTS IN THEIR OWN REDUCTIONS, FAILED TO COME UP TO DECISIONS

REACHED IN THE PRELIMINARY TALKS. HOWEVER, FOR THE FIRST TIME IN RECENT INFORMAL SESSIONS, EASTERN REPS DID NOT MAKE THE CHARGE THAT WEST WAS ENGAGED IN FORCE INCREASES DURING THE NEGOTIATIONS. CANADIAN REP GRANDE ANALYZED THE JUNE 28, 1973 COMMUNIQUE IN ORDER TO REBUT EASTERN CLAIMS THAT THE WARSAW PACT POSITION CONFORMED TO THE COMMUNIQUE AND THAT THE WESTERN POSITION DID NOT.

5. IN A LENGTHY COMMENTARY, SOVIET REP KHLESTOV REPEATED THE EASTERN CLAIM THAT THE WESTERN FORCUS ON GROUND FORCES WAS NEITHER SCIENTIFIC NOR LOGICAL BECAUSE IT LEFT OUT FORCE ELEMENTS WHICH WOULD BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT IN ANY OBJECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE EAST-WEST FORCE RELATIONSHIP IN THE REDUCTION AREA. KHLESTOV CRITICIZED WESTERN CLAIMS THAT ANY REDUCTION AGREEMENT WOULD CREATE NEW ADVANTAGES FOR THE EAST, ON THE GROUNDS THAT THIS ARGUMENTATION WENT BEYOND THE AGREED SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, TO TAKE UP THE WHOLE ISSUE OF COMPARATIVE CAPACITY OF PARTICIPANTS TO MOBILIZE. US AND FRG REPS AGREED THAT MOBILIZATION OF RESERVES WAS NOT WITHIN THE AGREED SCOPE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS, AND POINTED OUT THAT THE NEW EASTERN ADVANTAGES THE WEST WAS TALKING ABOUT DEALT DIRECTLY WITH THE EFFECTS OF REDUCTION AGREEMENTS ON ACTIVE DUTY FORCES, AN ISSUE WHICH CERTAINLY DID BELONG TO THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE NEGOTIATIONS. KHLESTOV ONCE AGAIN RAISED THE POSSIBILITY OF AN INITIAL REDUCTION STEP AS A FIRST PRACTICAL STEP FORWARD.

6. IN THE MARCH 25 PLENARY MEETING, BELGIAN REP ADRIAENSSEN PRESENTED THE ONLY STATEMENT. ADRIAENSSEN BEGAN BY BRIEFLY RECALLING THE RECENT FRG AND LUXEMBOURG PLENARY STATEMENTS, WHICH DEMANDED COMPENSATION FOR
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THE UNALTERABLE EASTERN GEOGRAPHIC ADVANTAGES AND FOR THE ADDITIONAL ADVANTAGES WHICH WILL ACCRUE TO THE EAST AS A RESULT OF ANY FUTURE AGREEMENT. AFTER REVIEWING THE ALLIED INTERPRETATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF UNDIMINISHED SECURITY, ADRIAENSSEN WENT ON TO REVIEW THE EXISTING EASTERN ADVANTAGES IN GROUND FORCE MANPOWER AND MAIN BATTLE TANKS AND TO CALL FOR THE ELIMINATION AND MITIGATION OF THESE EASTERN GROUND FORCE ADVANTAGES. BELGIAN REP CLOSED BY RESTATING THE WESTERN PROPOSAL FOR A COMMON CEILING ON OVERALL GROUND FORCE MANPOWER ON EACH SIDE, AND FOR AN OUTCOME OF APPROXIMATE PARITY IN GROUND FORCES. RESOR

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